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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
be that the Constitution affords no protection against Mch
invasions of individual security.f'5
It is regretted that the Court in Silverman failed to give heed to
the warning sounded by Mr. Justice Brandeis. An intrusion by
stealth upon individual privacy by police officers should be unlawful
under the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment whether
the intrusion be in form of an electronic or microwave beam, a
light wave, or a sound wave and regardless of the absence or presence
of a "physical invasion."
Indeed, one might even question whether in the principal case
the spike's touching the heating duct and thereby transforming it
into a sounding board was actually a physical invasion of the de-
fendants' house. This is especially so in view of the Court's curt
dismissal of technical trespass property law as insignificant. More-
over, there would seem to be little difference between the "usurpa-
tion" of the heating system of a house by converting it into a "giant
microphone" and simply plucking from the air the sounds within a
house by means of an electronic device that may not even touch any
part of the house.
Should the Court discard the premise upon which Olmstead,
Goldman, On Lee and Silverman are based, the effect of such a
decision would undoubtedly be detrimental to the present practices
of police investigations and criminal prosecutions. But, as stated by
Mr. Justice Franfurter in a dissenting opinion in On Lee,'0 "crim-
inal prosecution is more than a game. And in any event it should
not be deemed to be a dirty game in which 'the dirty business' of
criminals is outwitted by the 'the dirty business' of law officers."
THoMAS M. STARNES
Domestic Relations-Evidence-Presumption of Validity of Second
Marriage
It is generally held that where a marriage in fact has been proved
or admitted, the law raises a presumption that it is valid.' This rule
" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (dissenting
opinion). (Emphasis added.)
16343 U.S. 747, 758 (1952) (dissent).
'E.g., Gee Chee On v. Brownell, 253 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1958); Brooms
v. Brooms, 151 Cal. App. 2d 343, 311 P.2d 562 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Whelan v. Whelan, 346 Ill. App. 445, 105 N.E.2d 314 (1952); Wilson v.
Mitchell, 10 Misc. 2d 559, 169 N.Y.S.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See generally
Annot., 77 A.L.R. 729 (1932); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 464 (1925).
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is applied without difficulty where only one marriage is in question.
However, if successive marriages of the same person are involved,
the situation becomes more complex in that the courts are confronted
with conflicting presumptions.2 A great majority of jurisdictions'
in this situation follow the position taken in Parker v. American
Lumber Corp.4 where the court stated:
The decided weight of authority, and we think the correct
view, is that where two marriages of the same person are
shown, the second marriage is presumed to be valid; that
such presumption is stronger than and overcomes the pre-
sumption of the continuance of the first marriage, so that a
person who attacks a second marriage has the burden of
producing evidence of its invalidity. Where both parties to
the first marriage are shown to be living at the time of the
second marriage it is presumed in favor of the second mar-
riage that the first was dissolved by divorce. These pre-
sumptions arise, it is said, because the law presumes morality
and legitimacy, not immorality and bastards.5
Although the presumption is of great value to the party for
whom it operates in that it places the burden of proving the invalid-
ity of the second marriage on the party attacking it,' it has no addi-
tional value. Its effect is merely to invoke a rule of law compelling
the jury to reach a certain result in the absence of testimony to the
contrary." Thus the presumption is not conclusive, but may be re-
butted by proof of a valid prior marriage and by proof that such
marriage has not been terminated by death or divorce.8
2 For example, the presumption of the continuance of a status, or condi-
tion, once proved to exist (here the first marriage) and the presumption of
the continuing life of the wife of the former marriage.
3E.g., Ellenwood v. Ellenwood, 157 Fla. 640, 26 So. 2d 655 (1946); Rose
v. Rose, 274 Ky. 208, 118 S.W.2d 529 (1938); Davis v. Davis, 2 Wash. 2d
448, 101 P.2d 313 (1940).
'190 Va. 181, 56 S.E.2d 214 (1949).5Id. at 185, 56 S.E.2d at 216.
Gainey v. Gainey, 119 Cal. App. 2d 564, 259 P.2d 984 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953); Keller v. Linsenmyer, 101 N.J. Eq. 664, 139 Ati. 33 (Ct. Ch. 1927);
Williams v. Smith, 16 Misc. 2d 585, 184 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Vaughan v. Vaughan, 195 Miss. 463, 16 So. 2d 23 (1943). See gen-
erally 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
8 Hamburgh v. Hys, 22 Cal. App. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 301 (Dist. Ct. App.
1937). Although proving that a divorce has not taken place involves proof
of a negative, this task would seem to have been made considerably easier in
North Carolina by the enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-52.1 (1958),
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In Kearney v. Thomas9 North Carolina adopted the majority
view of presuming the second marriage to be valid. It was there
stated that the majority view was "so abundantly supported by well
considered cases, so consonant with reason, and so consistent with
analogous practices, as to justify its adoption."'"
In the recent case of Williams v. Williams," however, the court
refused to hold that upon proof of a subsequent marriage a pre-
sumption of its validity was raised. In this case A, the admitted
first wife of W, the decedent, petitioned the court that she be allotted
dower in his lands. Thereafter B filed an interplea in which she
alleged that she was the surviving widow. In support of her claim
B introduced evidence of a certificate authorizing the marriage and
of its return showing that the marriage ceremony had been per-
formed. She also offered evidence to the effect that until W's death
they had lived together as man and wife for nearly five and one-half
years, and that her name appeared on his death certificate as the
surviving spouse. Instead of presuming B's marriage valid upon
this proof, the court held that the burden was upon her to show that
W's prior marriage to A, which was admitted to be valid, had
been invalidated or dissolved.
The court justified its decision on the grounds that the inter-
venor has the burden of proving his case and establishing the rights
claimed,' and that one who asserts a property right which is de-
pendent upon the invalidity of a marriage must make good his cause
by proof.' 3 However, there would seem to be no reason why an
intervenor could not be aided by the operation of presumptions.14
By failing to recognize the presumption, the court has clearly failed
to give the intervenor the benefit of the rule announced in the
which provides for the central registration of all divorces granted by the
North Carolina courts.
p225 N.C. 156, 33 S.E.2d 871 (1945). In this case the plaintiffs, children
of the first marriage, were heirs at law of Alexander Kearney. The de-
fendant was the second wife. Plaintiffs contended that the property which
was the subject of the suit descended to them on the death of their father
free of any dower claim of the defendant because the second marriage was
bigamous and, therefore, void.10 Id. at 164, 33 S.E.2d at 877.
11254 N.C. 729, 120 S.E.2d 68 (1961).12 Id. at 730, 120 S.E.2d at 69.
Id. at 731, 120 S.E.2d at 70.
1, In Parker v. American Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 181, 56 S.E.2d 214
(1949), the court allowed the plaintiff the benefit of the presumption. Forr
the purpose of determining the availability of presumptions there would
seem to be no difference between a plaintiff and an intervenor.
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Kearney case that "proof of the second marriage adduced by the
defendant, if sufficient to establish it before the jury, raises a pre-
sumption of its validity, upon which property rights growing out
of its validity may be based."
'15
The court attempted to distinguish this decision from the Kearney
case on the ground that in Kearney, the death of the first wife
being admitted, the question before the court was whether or not
the evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury upon the
validity of a subsequent marriage. The validity of this distinction
is questionable. In Kearney the court stated that the question be-
fore it was whether the burden of the issues submitted to the jury
was properly placed on the plaintiffs or on the defendant. This
would seem to be the substance of the problem before the court in the
Williams case. Moreover, in Kearney the first wife was alive at the
time of the subsequent marriage although it was admitted that she
was dead at the time suit was brought. Both cases, therefore, in-
volved a second marriage while the first wife was alive. One factual
distinction between the cases is that in the Kearney case the de-
fendant was seeking to establish the second marriage rather than
the intervenor as in Williams. However, the position of the parties
to the suit would not seem to be determinative of whether the pre-
sumption applies.
Furthermore, there would seem to be better grounds for applying
the presumption in Williams than in Kearney. In Williams the
first wife was a party to the suit and was present to give evidence
rebutting the presumption, but in Kearney the first wife was not
-- 225 N.C. 156, 163-64, 33 S.E.2d 871, 876-77 (1945). As to the amount
of proof necessary to raise the presumption, the court in this case stated: "It
is to be noted here that the existence, or fact, of the second marriage was
supported not only by reputation and cohabitation, but by the direct evidence
of the defendant as to the ceremony of marriage, and by the certified copies
challenged by the plaintiffs." Id. at 164, 33 S.E.2d at 877. In refusing to
allow the presumption in Forbes v. Burgess, 158 N.C. 131, 73 S.E. 792
(1912), the court said: "Although where a marriage is established by a proof
of the fact in any competent way, it raises a presumption that any prior
marriage which is relied on to invalidate the second marriage has been
dissolved by death or divorce, the presumption of death or divorce will not be
indulged in favor of an alleged second marriage, the proof of which rests
only on cohabitation and reputation." Id. at 133, 73 S.E. at 792-93.
The proof offered in the principal case consisted of more than proof of
cohabitation and reputation; in fact it was almost the same as that offered in
the Kearney case. Therefore, applying the standard prescribed by these
two cases, it would seem that the proof was sufficient to raise the presump-
tion.
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present. Thus in Kearney the court put the burden of proving the
validity and continued existence of the first marriage upon parties
who did not have personal knowledge of the facts, but in Williams
it refused to place the burden on the party who did have personal
knowledge.
If the court is basing its refusal to allow the intervenor the
benefit of the presumption because she is an intervenor rather than
a defendant, the court is putting unwarranted stress on who gets
to court first and instigates the suit. The fact that the second wife
has gone through the requisite marriage ceremony and has lived
with a man as his wife for several years without any objection from
his former wife should have the same significance regardless of
whether she is the plaintiff, defendant or intervenor. If, on the
other hand, the court is refusing to allow the intevenor the benefit
of the presumption because it has decided to no longer afford the
second marriage a presumption of validity, the court, as stated in the
dissenting opinion in Williams, should expressly overrule the
Kearney case and specifically state what the law is in this state.
Regardless of why the court in Williams failed to give the bene-
fit of the presumption to the intervenor, the better policy would
seem to be to uniformly place the burden on the party attacking the
validity of the second marriage. Not only does public policy'0
dictate that the second marriage be presumed valid, but also the
first wife is in a better position to give evidence about the contract
to which she is a party than the second wife. Thus it is hoped
that at its next opportunity the court will make clear that the pre-
sumption of validity of the second marriage, as adopted in the
Kearney case, is available to all parties, regardless of their position
in the action.
H. MORRISON JOHNSTON, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship-Corporation's
Principal Place of Business-Multiple Incorporation
In Kelly v. United States Steel Corp.' the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals was called upon for the first time to interpret the term
"principal place of business" as used in the diversity jurisdiction
" Marriage being an accepted and desirable social institution, the court
should favor the parties alleging the marriage by presuming them innocent
of bigamy and by presuming the children by the union legitimate.
1284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960).
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